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Abstract
This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts, with special
reference to a National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zero and general practitioners act as
gatekeepers to publicly financed specialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that may explain the
continuously increasing use of hospital emergency visits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extended
version of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiated contacts is presented, allowing for individual and
town residence size differences in perceived quality (preferences) between alternative providers and including travel
and waiting time as non-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model of provider choice are presented.
Individual choice between alternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care, primary care, hospital and
clinic emergency services. Welfare implications and income effects are analyzed by computing compensating
variations, and by simulating the effects of user fees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensating variation
per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost of emergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appear
as an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions. 
Keywords: Health care demand, emergency visits, nested multinomial logit, compensating
variation, time costs.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice that patients make from among a
nested set of alternative providers, specifically restricting our attention to the first stage of the
process, patient-initiated contacts. We seek to analyze the effects of individual and provider specific
factors on the individual´s choice. The impact of travel and waiting time and the perceived quality
of each alternative provider are deemed of special interest from among the relevant potentially
explanatory characteristics. Implications for public policy are considered.
Many empirical studies of demand for health care implicitly consider the patient as the only agent
determining the demand for medical care, especially those in the tradition of Grossman's model.
Nevertheless, many of them do not suitably separate the modelling of contact analysis and
frequency analysis (see the discussion in Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). Modelling patient contact
decisions in a National Health Service (NHS) is a relevant issue for policy-making, in order to
design incentive regulation tools for improving the economic efficiency of individual decisions.
Applied studies of demand for health care in developed countries where there are no monetary
access prices have paid little attention to the extremely high and continuously increasing use of
hospital emergency visits as an alternative choice to other health care providers (especially primary
care). This fact is one of the most important distinctive characteristics of the Spanish health care
system of recent years. Hospital emergency services are probably perceived by individuals as higher
quality providers than primary care services and there are no access barriers, given the low
satisfaction with primary care services reported by patients; moreover, the price the consumer pays
at the time of purchase of medical care is the same in both cases (zero). This paper attempts to
highlight the factors affecting behavioural decisions and why they probably deviate from social
efficiency criteria, given the absence of incentives to consider social opportunity cost in individual
choice decision.
Three empirical observations at the aggregate level illustrate and confirm the need to explain the
behavioural changes in choice decisions in the last decade and their implications for the efficiency of
the Spanish health care system. First, hospital emergency visits that resulted in immediate discharge4
were, in 1981, 64.4 per 1000 inhabitants; by 1991 this figure had increased to 296.8; that is, that
type of hospital visit multiplied by 4.6 in ten years.
Second, the technologically sophisticated and input-demanding services of hospital emergency units
are treating an increasing number of less complex and less severely ill patients. The probability of a
hospital emergency visit resulting in immediate discharge (taken as a proxy of the average severity
of patients treated), increased from 0.577 in 1981 to 0.841 in 1991. That is, there was an increase
of 45.7% in ten years
1.  
Third, we can observe considerable regional variation in the choice of emergency hospital services
from patient-initiated contacts, which calls for explanation. The per capita rate of hospital
emergency visits resulting in immediate discharge ranged from 0.448 in Catalonia to 0.174 in
Castilla-La Mancha in 1991. That is, the difference between the highest and the lowest regional use
is higher than 2.6 times.
Micro-economic models of discrete choice random utility are appropriate for explaining individual
choice from among a discrete number of alternatives, taking into consideration the characteristics of
each alternative. By means of a nested multinomial logit model (NMLM) we analyze the elements
that influence individuals´ choice between the following provider alternatives in the Spanish health
system: GP (public or private), emergency visits (hospital or clinic) and specialist. These provider
alternatives differ in various characteristics, such as quality of care, intensity of technology, price
and time spent, which will be analyzed below. Only patient-initiated contacts are considered, in
order to reduce the effects of supply-induced demand; visits may be related to diagnosis and/or
treatment.  
Applied economics literature on the discrete nature of the decision to utilize a medical service
(conditional probability of contact) has employed various model specifications. Specifications use
dichotomous dependent variables: the negative binomial distributed hurdle model (Pohlmeier and
Ulrich, 1995); the probit model (Manning et al., 1987; Wedig, 1988); the multinomial logit model
                    
1 Hospital outpatient activity is consequently moving towards emergency services: in 1981 emergency visits
resulting in immediate discharge accounted for 11.8% of total outpatient visits; in 1991 they accounted for
39.7%.5
(Mwabu et al., 1993). Specifications using a polychotomous dependent variable: the nested logit
model (Gertler, Locay and Sanderson, 1987; Dor, Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1987; Ellis, McInnes
and Stephenson, 1994). Bolduc, Lacroix and Muller (1996) estimated three different discrete
choice models of provider choice: a multinomial probit model, a multinomial independent probit
model and a multinomial logit model. Conditional utility functions may be defined in the analysis for
each alternative considered in the decision-making problem, and each presents a random
component.
The statistical distribution of the random component determines whether the appropriate model is a
probit, a logit or a nested model. If the vector of random components is independently drawn from
a normal distribution, probit is the appropriate model. It it is independently drawn from an extreme
value distribution, it is a logit model. Logit and probit models are based on the idea of a continuous
threshold-crossing latent dependent variable with an observable counterpart. We restrict our
attention to the NMLM,  testing for non-correlation among the unobserved components of utility
for alternatives within a nest (if there were correlation, the model would be reduced to the
multinomial logit). A possible alternative statistical specification to the nested multinomial logit
model (NMNL) could be a multinomial probit model (MP). Like the NMNL, the MP does not
suffer from the independence of irrelevant alternative hypotheses. The MP does, however, involve
the evaluation of a multi-fold normal integral (depending on the number of choices), making it
extremely difficult to estimate using standard techniques, although there is Gauss code for the
multinomial probit (Bolduc, Lacroix and Muller, 1996).
This paper contributes to the literature on health care demand in several ways. First, in the analysis
of the elements that make individuals chose emergency services as what we believe to be a
substitutive choice to primary care for non-severely ill patients. Secondly, in the use of the NMLM
to explain contact decisions in a developed country. To date, literature on the NMLM of health
care demand has been restricted to developing countries and has not accurately differentiated
between patient- and physician-initiated contacts, which need to be modelled as two different
stochastic processes. In addition, we introduce waiting time in the surgery as an explanatory
variable of choice between alternatives. Moreover, we explore measures of the compensating
variation associated with some hypothetical scenarios. Policy implications are obtained from the6
estimated income, and time elasticities enable the construction of hypotheses to explain the causes
of the rapid increase in emergency services utilization and to predict the effects of different user fee
scenarios.
This paper formulates an individual choice model for selecting a type of health care provider and
applies it empirically to a cross section of about 2000 individuals. It finds that waiting time is
important especially in the use of emergency services and that if user fees were to be introduced for
health care provision there would be regressive effects.
The paper is organized as follows. The section below presents the discrete choice model of
individual demand for health services and the empirical specification of the conditional utility
function. Section three includes the features of the nested multinomial logit model. Section four
describes the full and restricted alternative choice decision set and data, and includes the definition
of the variables. Results are presented and discussed in section five and section six. Section seven
concludes with some final remarks.
2. Analytical framework
In this paper we present an extended discrete choice model for the analysis of patient-initiated
contact, along the lines of Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987) and Dor, Gertler and Van der
Gaag (1987). Past studies analyzing health care have identified significant effects of time costs
(Acton (1975), Colle and Grossman (1978), Cameron et al. (1988), Cauley (1987), Primoff and
Hamilton (1995)). Our model considers the opportunity cost of travel time and also waiting time in
the budget constraint in the same way as if they were monetary prices, as suggested by Acton
(1975). Expected effectiveness and service quality of each alternative is modelled to depend on
patient and provider characteristics.
Assume that individual i in a given period faces J health care provider alternatives. For each j
alternative, the individual´s utility is given by the conditional utility function:
i,j i,j i,j U   =  U(H ,C ),     [1]7
where Hi,j = expected health status of individual i after receiving care from provider j; Ci,j =
consumption of goods other than health care, when individual i chooses health care provider j.
A simple budget constraint is defined as:
where Yi = individual income, and TPi,j is the total price of choosing provider j choice. The total
price is formed by two components: monetary price and non-monetary price. Then,
where Pj represents the monetary price of provider j (which is identical for all individuals; price
discrimination is not allowed) and Ti,j is the non-monetary price, which is measured as the
opportunity cost of time devoted to travelling and waiting in the j provider choice. Let TTi,j and
WTi,j represent travel time and waiting time associated with the choice of alternative j, and let wi be
the opportunity cost of time for individual i, then:
Provider price affects the contact decision, as a different proportion of the individual´s income
remains available for consumption of other goods.
 
Expected health status after being treated by provider j is represented by two additive factors: the
expected health status with alternative 0, j=0 being the case of self-care in the absence of formal
treatment by a health care provider; and the expected effectiveness of alternative j in relation to
alternative j=0. That is:
where Ei,j = expected effectiveness (or quality measure) of provider j, and Hi,0 = expected health
status from the choice of provider 0. Then, expected effectiveness may be represented as a
household production function which depends on patient and provider characteristics:
i i,j i,j Y  =  C +TP ,     [2]
i i,j j i,j Y   =  C +( P +T ),     [3]
i,j i i,j i,j T   =  w (TT +WT ),     [4] •
i,j i,j i,0 H   =   E + H ,     [5]
i,j i j E  =  E( X ,Z ),     [6]14
consistent, asymptotically normal, although not asymptotically efficient, estimates of all the rs
coefficients and utility function parameters (McFadden (1981), Horowitz (1987)).
Besides the well-known log-likelihood ratio test of goodness-of-fit, two other specification tests
were applied to the estimated models: Hausman and McFadden's test mentioned above and a
specification test proposed by Horowitz (1987). The latter permits discrimination between any two
nested models although whose specifications are such that neither can be obtained as a parametric
special case of the other. Nested logit models with different trees are examples of models that
satisfy this requirement. A correctly specified model would have a larger log-likelihood than any
other.
Consequently, if under the null model A is correctly specified,
where L denotes the log-likelihood, B is another model, z is the standard normal variate, and F is
the cumulative normal function.
In the empirical NMNL estimation of the model represented by Equation [14], those parameters
relating to variables that remain constant for all individuals (they do not vary between individuals
given alternative j) cannot be estimated. This is the case of the vector b1, which effect is
accumulated in the constant factor estimated for every provider alternative.
The estimated NMLM may be employed to calculate the expected compensating variation
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i i j j i,j V  =  V( X ,Y ,Z ,P ,T ),     [19]16
4. Data and variable definition
Our data were obtained from the results of the Spanish National Health Survey ("Encuesta
Nacional de Salud") conducted in 1992. This survey includes a wide range of information on health
conditions and health care utilization, as well as socio-economic data on non-institutionalized
Spanish people. Because the sample is not representative for children, only individuals aged 16 or
over were taken into account. Unfortunately, no data set available provides all the information
required for the analysis, nor with the desirable characteristics.  The data set used was one of the
most adequate for our purposes, but it had some limitations that have to be taken into account
when interpreting results, and imposed the need to introduce the following hypothesis and
screening.
First, since we wanted to analyze the factors that influence first an individual’s decision to seek
care, and secondly what type of care provider to seek, both individuals who did not and those who
did seek formal care were included in our sample. Second, our attention was focused basically in
the decisions between emergency services provision ans other type of provisions. Therefore, we
excluded from the sample all contacts realised to obtain drug prescriptions (these are not provided
by emergency room services). The same applies to preventive contacts, and hence all individuals
who did not report any health problem within the two weeks previous to the interview were
removed from the sample. Only treatment and/or diagnostic patient-initiated contacts were taken
into account.
We also removed from the sample all those individuals whi had an accident in the relevant period of
analysis, since given the organization of health services in Spain, having an accident is a typical case
in which individual’s choice of provider is more restricted: emergency visits is less a substitute for
other alternatives.
The potential relevant set of choices has also to be restricted because of organizational
characteristics of health services. The public (NHS) specialist alternative is irrelevant for the case of
patient-initiated contacts, since Gps act as gatekeepers for those services. Also clinic emergency17
visits is not a usual and available alternative (and funding is primarily through the NHS). Hence,
emergency services are restricted to hospital ones.
To choose the type of reported illness suitable to our analysis (once accidents are removed from the
sample), we had to choose between different alternatives. Several indicators of health problems can
be used. One which has been employed fairly often is having had to remain in bed for some days, as
indicating the existence of some restriction in activity which may give cause to seek formal care.
However, this measure is quite stringent for our analysis, since it can remove some causes of formal
care contacts which may be relevant. Therefore, we chose another available indicator: having had
any limitation in daily activity, which includes causes of restricted activity such as depression,
diarrhoea, muscular pain, etc. Also, individuals having received more than one type of service
during the period and those reporting chronic disorders have been excluded. After all these
considerations, the sample consisted of 1959 individuals for whom the perceived health status was
also known.
Notice our attention was on patient-initiated contacts, since the relevant issue of study was the
choice of provider by individuals. Unfortunately, with the data set finally chosen, and once the
screening done and previously described, to the initial data set, there were still difficulties to
completely separate those individuals included in our sata set who sought formal care in a patient-
initiated contact from those referred by a professional. Therefore, some simplifying assumptions
had to be made.
First, the decision to use services as emergency visits is alwalys treated as a patient-initiated
contact. Second, acces to general practitioner’s services is also considered to be the result of a
patient-initiated decisions: this is clearly the case when the reported contact refers to the first visit of
the clinical episode; otherwise, we assume that originally it was a patient-initiated contact. More
problematic is whether to ascribe a contact with specialized clinic services to patient-initiated or
referral decisions. Taking into consideration that in the NHS general practitioners act as
gatekeepers for these services, NHS visits are excluded in this case; in contrast, we maintain
privately financed contacts in the data set due to the direct access of patients to these services, in
spite of the fact that some unknown number of them may reflect referred contacts. However, in this18
case, patient preferences constitute a crucial factor of choice, since there is, as already said, easy
direct access for patients to these kind of providers.
The choice decision set
The choice decision set consists of a multiple nested decision set, in which the first decision is
whether to seek or not to seek formal care. Not to seek formal care is a possible alternative, and if
not accounted for, the compensating variation estimation would be biased, since alternatives would
be reduced to the formal care subset
3. If formal care is chosen, then there are three nests between
which the individual can choose: GP, emergency visits and specialist. The next subnests include
alternative providers which differ basically in the financing mechanism of the provider: public
provider(NHS) versus private provider (by direct payment or through private insurance schemes).
The public provider is the NHS, which is financed mainly out of general taxation and which covers
most of the population (98% in 1989).
Variable definition
The vector X of individual characteristics is given by the following variables (Table 1 shows the
labels and the description of the variables selected for the analysis): age, sex, smoking habits,
physical exercise, town residence size, education, perceived health status, and chronic disorders.
Age (a continuous variable) proxies the depreciation of health capital (Grossman, 1972), as well as
individuals' preferences towards health care. Another individual-related characteristic which affects
health capital depreciation is sex (a categorical variable), and several studies have found that
demand for health services differs according to sex (e.g., Birch et al., 1993). Also, the "level of
physical stress" can affect the health capital rate of depreciation; we included the following variables
to take account of it: being a smoker (yes, no), and "level of physical effort" (low, medium, high).
Education may affect preferences, and the characteristics of each provider knowledge level (as well
as own health time productivity). Four levels of education were distinguished: none or able to read
and write, primary, secondary, further. Finally, the last individual characteristic to be included that
                    
3 See E.R. Morey et al. (1993).19
can affect expected utility of providers was health status. Two measures of individual health status
were taken into account: perceived health status (bad and very bad, fair, good and very good), and
the number of chronic disorders.
Travel time to the provider and waiting time between arriving at the supplier office and being
treated were obtained by direct response of individuals
4. For those alternatives not chosen by the
individual, we computed the average time of those who did choose them, controlling for possible
differences due to the autonomous community of residence, patient income and the size of the town
of residence (which may condition, among other factors, the availability of public transport and the
distance between home and the provider's office). Following Gertler et al. (1987), we estimated
travel and waiting time using different sub-samples of individuals seeking care at each different
provider.
Income is a non-observable variable; the survey only included social status (a categorical variable),
proxied by employment status and level of studies. Since a categorical variable is not suitable in our
model, income level was proxied by computing disposable income (after taxes) at each social status
from the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey. Possible differences due to autonomous community
and size of town of residence were taken into account. Family income was used, since it seems
more relevant than individual income as a determinant of demand for health care
5.
Prices payed by the individual at the point of consumption of formal care are as follows: all NHS
alternatives are free of charge; all private insurance alternatives can also be considered free of
charge at the moment of consumption, since there is evidence from other sources (González, 1994)
that most of them are of this type
6; for the remaining alternatives, market prices were taken as those
                    
4 The time spent between booking an appointment in primary care services and the next available appointment
can not be considered to be a factor influencing the choice of alternative providers, such as emergency room
visits, because a physician visit in primary care can usually be obtained for the same day for the first contact.
5 It was not possible to compute equivalent income, since the information needed to do so was not compatible
between the two sources of data.
6  It is assumed that all private insurance packages held by the patients have no cost sharing provisions. In
González (1994) it is obtained that most private insurances are of the type of a restricted list of providers,
which the insured can access by previous payment of a premium, and free of charge at the moment of
consumption. Therefore, the problem of measurement error due to non-zero price at the moment of
consumption is reduced.20
average prices recommended by the physician's union. For those who sought care, price data were
only available for the alternative they chose.
Finally, opportunity cost of time was calculated as income per hour, and taken from the
contemporaneous Spanish Family Expenditure Survey. To take into account differences in the
value of opportunity costs of time among individuals, income level was adjusted according to the
employment status of individuals, distinguishing between those who work and those who do not,
and whether they are retired, unemployed, students, or housewives. For individuals who were
working, unit opportunity costs is taken to be per hour wage. For those not working, theory usually
looks for the best alternative to leisure time, to put a value on it. For those who are non-voluntarily
out of work (i.e., unemployed), time would be valued between zero and income which could be
obtained if working. This income was assumed to be equal of those working, matched by gender,
age and marital status. For those voluntarily not working (let us assume that this is the case for
housewives and students), leisure would be valued as at least equal to the otherwise obtainable
income. However, those who are not voluntarily working have more flexibility in scheduling care
and fewer constraints on time, which may affect the demand for health services (see Primoff and
Hamilton, 1995; Van de Ven and Van der Gaag, 1982). It can be considered that this time
availability effect is allowed for by reducing opportunity costs for voluntary non-working
individuals; as it is quite common in these type of studies, we have considered opportunity cost of
time to be one third of per hour wage.
 
Unfortunately, empirical measures of the vector of provider characteristics which affect their
perceived effectiveness are not available. This is an unavoidable feature of the available data which
represents a potential for omitted variable bias.21
5. Results
The parameters of an NMLM estimated in the two-stage method described above are presented in
Table 2 to Table 5 for the three decision levels previously specified. Note that at all the decision
levels the log-likelihood ratio test of goodness-of-fit of the estimated model was statistically
significant. Note that all standard errors were relatively high. This could be a consequence of the
presence of a high level of multicolinearity in our estimated models. Therefore, since efficiency is
not guaranteed in the estimation process, it is very likely that those coefficients with a t-ratio (or
equivalently a Wald test) greater than one could actually be statistically significant (Johnston,
1987).
The estimated values of r for each decision level are significantly less than one and significantly
greater than zero at the 1% level
7. This confirms that the NMLM is consistent with the utility
maximization hypothesis and the multinomial logit model may not be suitable in this case (a null
hypothesis regarding independence of irrelevant alternatives is rejected). As expected, the results of
the Hausman and McFadden's tests suggest that the parameters of a full multinomial logit model
and those of the restricted choice sets were statistically different
8. Following Horowitz (1987), we
also tried other nested logit models with different trees. In all cases our original nested model had a
larger log-likelihood than any other and, therefore, the former was preferred
9.
                    
7 The obtained coefficients are as follows (standard errors in brackets):
Level 1  Formal Care 0.28940 (0.0914)
Level 2 General Practitioner  0.52752 (0.1890)
Specialist 0.59258 (0.1147)
     
8 Results of the Hausman and McFadden's tests:
- Multinomial logit (full) versus GP (level 3.1) 54.5
*
- Multinomial logit (full) versus specialist (level 3.2) 35.7
*
- Multinomial logit (full) versus formal care (level 2) 45.8
*
(*) p<0.001.
     
9 Log-likelihood estimated nested model -2716.60
       Log-likelihood nested 2 levels -2607.36
       Difference    109.24
*
(*) p<0.001.22
The coefficients a1 and a2 on the individual income and individual income squared, respectively, are
both positive and significantly different from zero (p< 0.001)
10. As previously defined, income
variables refer to consumption other than health care after health care provider decision. This
implies that the effect of travel and waiting time are reflected in the model via these terms
11.
Consumption varies between alternatives because travel and waiting time differ. Income and
monetary and non-monetary costs are an important determinant of provider choice in the demand
for medical care. The influence of the effect of these variables is explored by the analysis of time
elasticities of the demand for general practitioners, emergency visits and specialists. Table 6
presents travel and waiting time elasticities calculated in the range of zero to two hours for each
social status group.
[Table 6]
The results in Table 6 show differences in the time price elasticity for each social status group,
holding income constant (by rows). At the same time, in this table we present the change in the time
price elasticity as income rises, holding travel time constant, in order to better assess the influence
of non-monetary price and income on the demand for medical care (travel and waiting time and
income enter the demand functions in a highly non-linear fashion). The arc travel and waiting time
elasticities calculated are defined as the total percentage change in the demand for the alternative
with respect to a change of one percent in total time cost. The elasticities are calculated for fifteen
minutes to one hour. In the range of zero to one hour, general practitioner demand is very
insensitive to travel and waiting time. That is, patients consider that up to one hour spent getting to
general practitioner's services is not a reason to change their demand for medical care to an
alternative provider. For most individuals, waiting time spent when general practitioner is the
provider choice is greater than one hour. Our results show that demand for emergency services is
vastly more elastic than demand for specialist services and for general practitioner's. Also, our
results show that demand is much more sensitive to price for the lowest income group of patients
                    
     
10 It is assumed that income is an exogenous variable in the determination of health care demand.
     
11 Average travellling time is greater for the NHS general practitioner option than for the emergency visit
option: 0.23 hours for the general practitioner option. However, average waiting time in emergency visits is
slightly less (0.55 hours) than the direct average waiting time for the general practitioner option (0.57 hours).23
than for the higher income group, which is in line with the pattern found by previous studies (Dor et
al., 1987; Gertler et al., 1987).
These results imply that the absence of fee payment in the access to emergency services does not
preclude the existence of differences in the opportunity of access to those services. The elasticity of
demand for low income patients is increasingly high as time increases. This trend was also observed
by Dor et al. (1987), who examined clinic and hospital arc travel time elasticities by income
quartile. Demand by low and middle income groups for emergency services is highly sensitive to
travel and waiting time. As waiting and travel time decreases, the higher the demand increase is for
these income groups. In fact, we observe that emergency services demand is very sensitive to time.
Elasticities are higher for all income groups and for all time ranges for emergency services than for
clinic specialist services.
These facts admit different interpretations, given the institutional context in which individual
decisions are observed. We are inclined to consider that the great differences in time elasticities
shown in Table 6 between income groups not only reflect different individual responses to
opportunity cost of time but also differences in the perceived quality or effectiveness of services.
We may hypothesize that the data indicate the higher value that high income patients attach to
hospital emergency services in comparison with general practitioners: they prefer to expend less
time in accessing these hospital services, probably with a high subjectively attributed quality, than
less time in accessing perceived less effective general practitioner. However, demand by high
income groups for general practitioners services is not sensitive to time, which probably reflects the
fact that the demand for this group is very low and/or the demand is in fact only sensitive when time
is over one hour. When time cost for emergency services increases, individuals in the middle and
low income groups decrease their demand very significantly, probably indicating a higher demand
for general practitioner services. Results indicate that the effect of an increase in congestion costs of
emergency services (higher waiting time imposed by an increase in utilization given emergency
service capacity) may result in a greater utilization decrease by middle and lower income groups.
The estimated parameters of individual patient characteristics are for the most part consistent with
expectations, given past literature and common sense. As was expected, health status (both24
perceived and the number of chronic disorders) play an important role on individual decisions, both
in terms of seeking formal care and the type of provider chosen. Even though the estimated
parameters are not significant in all cases, the general pattern observed is that worse health status
increases the probability of contacting a formal care provider. Individuals with worse perceived
health status are more likely to contact general practitioners under public financing, and less so
private insurance and direct payment providers. Then the probability of using hospital emergency
visits (and the quality attributed to the alternative) is greater for those individuals with regular or
good perceived health status than for those with poor perceived health status and with more
chronic disorders.
The probability of making use of formal care is significantly lower for males than females, except
for emergency visits. Differences in expected effectiveness perceived according to sex are also
relevant between GP providers: the probability of private insurance financed contact significantly
lower for men. Age plays a minor role in determining the decision of which type of provider to
choose. Even though the t-test for the estimates related to years of schooling are not significant in
all cases, it can be said that the results obtained indicate that in general the lower the level of formal
education, the higher the probability of seeking formal care, of making use of NHS GP services,
and the lower the probability of choosing the specialist alternative versus emergency visits and GPs.
Town residence size plays a significant role in the decision to choose between GPs and hospital
emergency visits. In big cities expected effectiveness or quality of emergency visits is given a
greater weight by individuals than in the case of general practitioners, once adjusted by other
explanatory variables.
Health-related characteristics, such as being a smoker, or doing little physical exercise, do not
increase the probability of seeking formal care but reduce it. The result obtained seems to be
consistent with a grossman style model in which individuals with a low demand for health would
have a low demand for all health inputs.
To complement the analysis of results conducted above, we will now consider the results from the
viewpoint of the level of decision (as opposed to that of the analysis of the effect of each
explanatory variable). Health status (poor), having chronic disorders, and no formal schooling are25
the only significant variables and with positive effects on the probability of seeking formal care
(some of them are clearly significant, others have t-test values greater than one). Being a smoker
and doing little exercise, and in general, living in larger towns, are significant factors with negative
effects on probability.
At decision level 2, it is worth noticing that being a smoker does seem to reduce the expected
effectiveness (and, then, the probability of making use) of emergency departments, while males and
those living in larger towns tend to expect a greater effectiveness of this provider alternative.
Choosing the emergency department alternative does not seem to depend on the education level,
age, having chronic disorders, or the physical exercise done.
6. Policy Implications
Demand and welfare effects of user fees for hospital emergency visits.- Cost sharing on emergency
visits is a strategy that reduces the use of services, as observed in the Health Insurance Experiment
(O'Grady et al., 1985). However, more interestingly, in the Health Insurance Experiment cost
sharing reduced the use of the emergency department more among patients with less severe
diagnoses; that is, a selective effect on inappropriate visits was observed. Selby et al. (1996) also
report a decline of about 15 percent among members of an HMO when a small copayment for the
use of emergency services was introduced. This study observed that the decline mostly affects
patients with conditions considered likely not to present an emergency.
Demand and welfare effects of various scenarios for the access conditions of individuals to hospital
emergency services financed by the NHS are considered. We explore the answer to two types of
questions in order to evaluate economic factors influencing individual's decision to choose
emergency visits.
Firstly, changes in demand and consumer welfare loss are observed when different user fees are
imposed on the use of these services by individuals not having had an accident. A range of user fees
from 1000 pesetas to 10000 is considered, which is equivalent to an increase in time (waiting
and/or travel) monetary equivalent value. Our applied welfare analysis makes the assumption that26
the impact of financial user charges are equivalent to time costs. We focus our attention on the
differential effects by socioeconomic groups. Imposing user fees on emergency services may be
interpreted as equivalent to consumers paying a two part-tariff composed of a fixed entry fee raised
through general taxation and a marginal constant price when the consumer decides to use the
service. Effects on consumer welfare of different user fee scenarios on patients who do not report
an accident may be crucial in order to evaluate the optimal capacity of NHS emergency services
when demand shows an accelerated growth with the monetary marginal price at the zero level. The
marginal price may reflect the long-term marginal cost of the service and/or the marginal cost of
congestion in terms of longer waiting time imposed on the other patients, given a defined level of
capacity.  
Secondly, we estimate the willingness to pay of each social status group of individuals, measured by
means of the compensating variation. How much income could be taken away from the consumer
so as to leave him or her indifferent when facing an emergency to the availability or unavailability of
an alternative, in the light of his or her present tastes?
[Table 7]
In Table 7 we use the estimated demand function to simulate the effects of user fees on the demand
and consumer welfare. Columns 2 to 5 in this table show the cumulative percentage change in
demand in emergency services given different uniform fees being imposed at hospital facilities.
Columns 6 to 9 show the percentage of welfare consumer loss expressed as percentage of
individual per hour income. A user fee of 5000 pesetas, for example, generates a 6.09 percent
reduction in demand of high income individuals, which is equivalent to a very low reduction in their
welfare, in terms of individual per hour income. However, as observed previously in analyzing arc
time elasticities, the effects on the lower income groups are quite large and substantially higher than
in the upper income ranges. Data in Table 7 demonstrate that a fee of 5000 pesetas generates a
reduction of 15.56% and of 33.50% in the demand of middle and low income individuals
respectively. This reduction in demand produces a welfare loss equivalent to 10.69% of per hour
income in lower income individuals. That is, not only is the reduction in total demand for
emergency services concentrated in the lowest income groups, but the greatest relative welfare loss27
is borne by them. The simulations indicate that the introduction of user fees for emergency services
are regressive in the sense that they generate a higher decrease in demand and welfare in poor
individuals than in the case of rich individuals. This fact must not be regarded as an argument
against the introduction of user fees, but a warning signal about the regressive effects they may
generate. These regressive effects may be adequately compensated through the design of the tax
system allowing for a tax reduction proportional to individual health expenditure in a progressive
income tax.
We hypothesize a policy eliminating emergency services for non-urgent conditions (identified as
those of individuals not reporting an accident and not resulting in a hospital admission), which is
equivalent to raising the price of hospital emergency visits to infinity. The expected compensating
variation is how much money you would have to give to the individual to make expected maximum
utility after the policy equal to expected maximum utility in the original state. The estimated "per
visit" compensating variation of this policy could be calculated for any individual as a function of
exogenous variables, as in Table 8. 
[ Table 8]
This model predicts that the individuals in the sample would pay on average 4928 pesetas to avoid
the elimination of the hospital emergency visit option for every visit. Estimated individual
compensating variations vary from 4599 to 5533 pesetas, representing differences in characteristics
of individuals. The estimated CV shows only small differences between individuals. In Table 8 the
mean CV for the five income quintiles confirms the homogeneity of individual willingness to pay.
Also, a slightly increasing trend in CV is observed across higher levels of income.
Our analysis suggests that CV for visits to emergency departments, including visits for minor
medical problems, indicates that the value of an additional visit may clearly be higher than its direct
marginal cost. Given the absence of reliable cost data, we may hypothesize that the regulated price
paid for an emergency visit by the public sector represents the average cost. Williams (1996) has
observed that, for a sample of six community hospitals in Michigan, the marginal cost was 4228
percent of the average cost. If this ratio holds for Spanish hospitals, the marginal cost of visits to
emergency departments may be around 2300 pesetas.
Finally, own and cross time price elasticities are estimated separately for travel time and for waiting
time of each alternative. The results are presented in Table 9. Own travel time elasticities are
statistically significant for the three alternatives considered: emergency visits, general practitioner
visits and specialist visits. The travel time price elasticity of emergency visits is higher than that of
general practitioners and specialists, indicating that the distance from the service is more important
in this case, which is in agreement with common sense, given the presumed urgent demand.
However, waiting time price elasticity of emergency visits is not significant, which may imply that
patients consider that the time is very low in comparison with the complete waiting time of the
alternatives, which involve consecutive visits to different health care services, and/or that this time
is not important given the quality of the service. Waiting time price elasticity is higher for specialist
services than travel time price elasticity, and higher than for general practitioner visits. These results
mean that if waiting time increases, then the demand for specialist visits (which are privately
financed) decreases in a higher proportion than if general practitioner visits show the same increase
in waiting time.
Cross time price elasticities yield an interesting result regarding the effect on emergency visit
demand when the overall waiting time of general practitioner visits increases. Cross waiting time
elasticity for emergency visits and general practitioner visits is 2.039. This result indicates that
emergency service demand undergoes a considerable increase (decrease) in demand when primary
services impose increasing (decreasing) cost on the patient in the form of prolonged waiting times.
The sign of the cross time elasticities indicates that emergency services are substitutes for general
practitioner and specialist visits.
[ Table 9 ]
7. Concluding Remarks29
We have derived a micro-economic model of discrete choice random utility to investigate individual
choice among a discrete number of health care provider alternatives, taking into consideration the
characteristics of each alternative, by means of a nested multinomial model. In addition to past
literature on health care demand, we specifically analyzed patient-initiated contacts with an NMNL
model introducing waiting time in the surgery as an explanatory variable of choice between
alternatives.
The article has examined the elements that make individuals choose hospital emergency services as
what we believe to be a substite for primary care for non-severely ill patients. We focus our
attention on the factors that may explain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergency
visits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extended version of a discrete choice model of
demand for patient-initiated contacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residence size
differences in perceived quality (preferences) between alternative providers and including travel and
waiting time as non-monetary costs. The results of a nested multinomial logit model of provider
choice are presented. Individual choice between alternatives is considered, in a repeated nested
structure: self-care, primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services.
The principal findings of this paper may be summarized in four main conclusions. First, our findings
indicate that indirect access cost such as travel and waiting time play an important role in the health
care provider choice when monetary prices are zero. The results confirm that the NMNL is
consistent with the utility maximization hypothesis, the multinomial logit model being inadequate.
The elasticity of demand for emergency services by low income patients is increasingly high as time
increases and higher than for high income patients. Demand by low and middle income groups for
emergency services is highly sensitive to travel and waiting time. We observe that demand for
emergency services is very sensitive to time. Elasticities are higher for all income groups and all
time ranges for emergency services than for clinic specialist services and general practitioner
services.
Second, own and cross time price elasticities indicate that emergency visits are substitutes for
general practitioner and specialist visits for patient-initiated contacts. We find that demand for
emergency visits is highly elastic with respect to waiting time for general practitioner visits: a30
decrease of 10% in waiting time in the general practitioner alternative would produce a decrease of
20.4% in the demand for emergency visits.
Third, the simulations indicate that the introduction of user fees for emergency services may result
in very regressive effects: the effects on the lower income groups are quite large and substantially
higher than in the upper income ranges. These regressive effects may be adequately compensated
through the design of the tax system allowing for a tax reduction proportional to individual health
expenditure in a progressive income tax.
And fourth, individuals would pay on average approximately 5000 pesetas per emergency visit to
avoid the loss of utility produced by a policy eliminating access to emergency services for non-
urgent conditions. This result indicates that the compensating variation per visit is higher than the
direct marginal cost of emergency visits (excluding congestion costs), and consequently, emergency
visits do not appear as an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.
This paper is motivated by the growth in the use of emergency visits and regional variation in the
pattern of visits across Spain. In order to explore this issue we used a nested multinomial logit
model to estimate patient initiated contacts with health care providers. However, lack of data make
the individual choice model for selecting a type of health care provider more ambitious than the
data: since there are no available variables reflecting characteristics of alternative providers, at the
empirical stage this aspect of the utility function is just ignored. Also, quite strong assumptions had
to be made in respect of time costs for those alternatives not chosen by the individual. However,
those are quite common in the literature, and difficult to overcome.31
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       LEVEL 1    LEVEL2           LEVEL 335














AGE (FROM AGE xx TO AGE yy)
SMOKER (1=yes; 0=no)
PHYSICAL EXERCISE (1=low; 2=medium; 3=high)
SEX (0=female; 1=male)
PERCEIVED HEALTH STATUS (1=poor; 2=regular; 3=good)
NUMBER OF CHRONIC DISORDERS
EDUCATION (1=none; 2=primary; 3=intermediate; 4=high)
TOWN RESIDENCE SIZE (1=<2000 inhab.; 2=2001-10000; 3=10001-





INDIVIDUAL PER HOUR INCOME36
TABLE 2. NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF LEVEL 1: FORMAL CARE



































































































(a) Coefficients are restricted to be equal among alternatives. These values are omitted in the following tables.37
TABLE 3. NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF LEVEL 2: GP, EMERGENCY
VISITS AND SPECIALIST





















































































































































Note.- Parentheses indicate t-statistics.38
TABLE 4. NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF LEVEL 3: ALTERNATIVE
CHOICE BETWEEN GENERAL PRACTITIONERS






















































































































































Note.- Parentheses indicate t-statistics.39
TABLE 5. NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF LEVEL 3: ALTERNATIVE
CHOICE BETWEEN SPECIALISTS













































































































Note.- Parentheses indicate t-statistics.
 40
Table 6.




TRAVEL AND WAITING TIME RANGE (hours)





















































DEMAND AND CONSUMERS' WELFARE EFFECTS OF USER FEE SIMULATIONS




USER FEE SIMULATION (Ptas.)
% DEMAND REDUCTION % WELFARE LOSS
a





























(a) Consumer welfare loss expressed as percentage of individual per hour income
(b) Wealthy and Medium-high42
Table 8.





















a. Standard deviation in parentheses43
Table 9.
TIME PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR EACH OPTION
ALTERNATIVE


















* 0.072 -0.066 2.039
* 0.084
GENERAL
PRACTTIONER
VISITS
-0.397
* 0.493
* -0.394
* 0.611
*
SPECIALIST
VISITS -0.288
* -0.537
*
* p<0.05